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CONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINAL SCOPE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Nathan S. Chapman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A number of scholars have questioned the utility of originalist methods for 
answering constitutional questions sounding in foreign affairs.1  Questions 
about the territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights are said to be 
especially hard because the U.S. Constitution provides few clues about how 
to understand its relationship to background law of other nations and 
common law norms about legislative and judicial jurisdiction.2  In the words 
of Ingrid Wuerth, no one has yet explained “why, how, and what kind of 
history is relevant” for answering such questions.3  Nevertheless, legal 
scholars persistently write papers on the original history of the Constitution 
and foreign affairs, not for the sake of so-called pure historical inquiry, but 
to help answer contemporary constitutional questions.4 
Wuerth’s recent paper, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights 
of Foreign Nations, is “Exhibit A.”5  She relies on conventional legal 
materials and forms of reasoning to argue that Article III and the Due Process 
 
*  Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law.  Thanks to the editors at 
Fordham for asking me to write this response.  Thanks also to Will Baude, Jud Campbell, 
Harlan Cohen, Bill Dodge, and Ingrid Wuerth for commenting on earlier drafts. 
 
 1. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, An Originalism for Foreign Affairs?, 53 ST. LOUIS. U. 
L.J. 5 (2008) (hereinafter Wuerth, Originalism); Eugene Kontorovich, Originalism and the 
Difficulties of History in Foreign Affairs, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 39 (2008). 
 2. See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 757, 762 (2013). 
 3. Wuerth, Originalism, supra note 1, at 8. 
 4. See, e.g., AMANDA L. TYLER, HABEAS CORPUS IN WARTIME: FROM THE TOWER OF 
LONDON TO GUANTANAMO BAY (2017); MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THE PRESIDENT WHO 
WOULD NOT BE KING (manuscript on file with author); ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD 
R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017); MICHAEL D. 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2007); Nathan S. Chapman, Due 
Process of War, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639 (2018); Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian 
Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original Constitutional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025 
(2018); Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under 
Treaties, 124 YALE L.J. 2202 (2015); Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1683 (2009); Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 
GEO. L.J. 463 (2007). 
 5. See generally Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of 
Foreign Nations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV 1 (2019). 
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Clause protect the notice and personal jurisdiction rights of foreign states.6  
Yet she provides no description or defense of her methodology.7  Without 
passing on her conclusions, this brief essay offers a qualified defense of 
scholarly (and judicial) attempts to construct the original territorial and 
personal scope (or domain) of constitutional rights. 
As to “why history is relevant,” the answer is simple: perhaps the only 
matter of consensus in the contemporary practice of American constitutional 
law is that the text of the Constitution is the source of that law.  Partly through 
the influence of originalism, American constitutional scholars and jurists 
have grown more sensitive to the importance of historical context for 
understanding the meaning of that text.8  Wuerth (and many other “foreign 
affairs” scholars) take this for granted, but it seems worth making explicit. 
As to “how” and “what kind of history,” the answer, as Wuerth and others 
have shown, is far more challenging.  The late eighteenth-century legal 
ecosystem—the relationships among the customary law of nations, treaties, 
statutes, the common law, and the Constitution—was vastly different than 
our own.  This is especially the case for the scope of constitutional rights.  
This response argues that Wuerth’s paper illustrates the most persuasive way 
to go about the task—one question at a time, with an emphasis on 
conventional legal materials and forms of argumentation.  Some questions 
will call for especially imaginative constructions.  This does not render them 
irrelevant, but it does caution some modesty about the extent to which they 
ought to trump competing constructions arising from practice and precedent.  
Despite her reluctance, then, Wuerth’s methods are entirely consistent with 
a confident originalism. 
I.  WHY HISTORY? 
Wuerth’s question is whether foreign states, as litigants in federal court, 
are entitled to separation of powers and due process protections, in particular 
the requirements of personal jurisdiction and notice.  To answer the question, 
she turns to constitutional text and history.  She provides little defense of this 
approach, especially considering her prior concerns about it.  Moreover, the 
move is arguably unnecessary to resolve her question.  This Part first explains 
why it is not obvious that the history is necessary, and then explains why it 
is. 
 
 6. See generally id. 
 7. See generally id. 
 8. See generally RAMSEY, supra note 4, at 2 (“[T]hrough close attention to the 
Constitution’s language and the historical and linguistic context in which it was written, we 
can uncover the text’s basic foreign affairs structure as it was designed and understood in the 
founding era.”); Kent, supra note 2.  Importantly, “foreign affairs” is an artificial category of 
constitutional law.  I do not mean to ignore the scholars exploring questions of separation of 
powers, territorial expansion, and individual rights (among other things) touching on issues of 
“foreign affairs” who have discussed interpretative methodology. 
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A.  An Argument Without History 
First, it is not obvious that the turn to history is necessary (or even 
advisable).  The doctrinal problem Wuerth seeks to resolve is the product of 
an unreflective interpretation of the word “person” in the Due Process 
Clause.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the word does not refer to 
U.S. states,9 and it declined to decide whether it refers to foreign states.10  On 
this basis, lower courts have held that the Clause does not protect foreign 
states. 
Quite apart from history, this interpretation of the Fifth Amendment seems 
wrong.  First, common sense: the modern default rule is that foreign states 
are entitled to immunity from suit for their governmental acts (without their 
consent), but not for their non-governmental acts.  For governmental acts, at 
least, why would the alternative to immunity be vulnerability to judgment 
without basic norms of fairness?  The greater privilege (immunity) would 
seem to imply the lesser rights (notice and basic fairness).  And if states’ acts 
are nongovernmental, why would they be entitled to lesser protection than 
foreign corporations?  The contrary position—that foreign states that are, for 
whatever reason, not immune from suit may nevertheless be subject to 
judgment without notice and personal jurisdiction—would be an aberration. 
Second, the modern doctrinal ground for the notion that foreign states are 
not entitled to notice and personal jurisdiction is dubious.  The Supreme 
Court has never decided the issue.  Lower courts have concluded that foreign 
states are not “persons” under the Due Process Clause, and therefore outside 
its protection,12 because the Supreme Court, in South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach,13 held that U.S. states are not such “persons.”14  But the holding 
in Katzenbach can hardly be taken at face value.  What the Court rejected 
was the notion that the Voting Rights Act violated a state’s due process rights 
by regulating its elections without prior judicial oversight.15  The Court’s 
holding was probably right, but for the wrong reason.  The case implicated 
South Carolina’s relative sovereignty, not its “life, liberty, or property.”  The 
Due Process Clause was simply irrelevant.  The Court was quite right when 
it said that “[t]he objections to the Act which are raised under these 
provisions [including the Due Process Clause] may therefore be considered 
only as additional aspects of the basic question presented by the case: Has 
Congress exercised its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an 
appropriate manner in relation to the States?”16  The case should be 
understood to have no implications for one in which a foreign (or U.S.) state’s 
property interests are directly at stake. 
 
 9. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966). 
 10. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992). 
 12. See Frontera Res. Azer. Corp. v. State Oil Co. 582 F.3d 393, 399 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 13. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 14. Id. at 323. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. at 324. 
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Yet to resolve this puzzle, Wuerth turns to the historical sources.  That they 
would yield an answer is not obvious.  Her question is in some respects 
deeply anachronistic—exactly the kind that creates a puzzle for historical 
sources.  During the early republic, a foreign state would rarely, if ever, have 
been a party to a suit in federal court without its consent.  A foreign state’s 
vessels and cargo were subject to condemnation as war prizes under the law 
of nations, but that law exempted the sovereign’s person (and ambassadors) 
from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts.  In my view, the fact that prize 
cases proceeded according to municipal law and traditional admiralty 
procedures is powerful evidence that a foreign state—when subject to a U.S. 
court’s jurisdiction—would have been entitled to traditional notice and due 
process.17  But it does not show that a state would have been subject to 
jurisdiction without its consent.  If a state did consent to suit, however, such 
consent would have guaranteed jurisdiction and customary notice.  So 
Wuerth’s questions would rarely, if ever, have arisen.  They arise now 
because Congress has eliminated sovereign immunity in some cases, 
meaning that foreign states can be haled into court without their consent, 
giving rise to the question of personal jurisdiction. 
So why turn to this seemingly moribund past for answers to contemporary 
legal problems?  The only defense Wuerth offers for her methodology is that 
constitutional text and history are “fruitful avenues of inquiry because they 
yield straightforward and sensible answers to modern questions about the 
constitutional status of foreign states.”18  With respect, I think this misses the 
point.  If the answers are straightforward and sensible, then why look to 
history for them?  We could have come up with them ourselves, and the fact 
that they are straightforward and sensible would simply be a mark in their 
favor, to be weighed against their costs.  In any case, this is not much of a 
justification in light of her own prior concerns about originalist methods for 
answering foreign affairs questions.19  Her methodology deserves a better 
defense. 
B.  Why History 
The best defense is (perhaps frustratingly) simple: American constitutional 
decision-makers privilege the text of the Constitution when answering a 
constitutional question, and they rely on historical context to ascertain the 
text’s meaning.  Why? 
 
 17. See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U.L. REV 377 
(2017). 
 18. See Wuerth, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 19. Elsewhere she has argued that “[h]istory is essential to understanding the relationship 
between executive authority and war and the struggle and acquiescence of Congress vis-à-vis 
the President,” ostensibly because of “the lack of judicial opinions in this area.” Wuerth, 
Originalism, supra note 1, at 27.  But again, this presumes rather than explains the salience of 
history for constitutional construction. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3501703 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520884
2019] CONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINAL SCOPE 5 
The short answer is that they do so because they do (and in fact always 
have).  As the judge in Auden’s poem unsatisfyingly insisted, “let me explain 
it once more, Law is The Law.”20 
This circularity does not mean the practice is arbitrary.  There is a good 
reason for it.  The Constitution is a text.  American lawyers have always 
privileged the constitutional text over any other sources of constitutional law.  
If there is any issue to take with Justice Jackson’s bon mot, it is that the most 
“fixed star in our constitutional constellation” has nothing to do with political 
orthodoxy or officials high or petty—it is rather that the Constitution is the 
Constitution.21 
And words have meaning.  Even the words that comprise laws.  
Originalists have not sufficiently explored the distinction between written 
laws (and among them, perhaps, constitutions) and other genres of texts.,  but 
they are quite right that words have meaning, and they gain that meaning 
from context, namely from contemporaneous usage by relevant communities.  
What makes laws unique is that their meaning depends upon their application 
to past, present, and future events beyond the text.  In this sense, the meanings 
of laws are always procrustean.  But this does not diminish the importance 
of their words, or the historical usage of those words, for ascertaining their 
principles. 
American lawyers have always applied this sensibility about the 
Constitution’s text when attempting to ascertain whether it prohibits or 
permits certain conduct.  In 1798, Justices Samuel Chase, William Paterson, 
and James Iredell all resorted to English constitutional history to ascertain 
whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applied to noncriminal cases.22  In 2014, 
Justice Breyer turned to founding-era resources to conclude that the Recess 
Appointments Clause is “ambiguous,” while Justice Antonin Scalia, 
dissenting, turned to the same sorts of resources to conclude that its meaning 
is “plain.”23 
And it is not only the Constitution that gets this treatment.  It just so 
happens that the Constitution is especially old.  Yet consider the recent 
debates about the meaning of the Alien Tort Statute,24 which was enacted 
before the Bill of Rights.  The debates focused on the provision’s text and 
history, not because the judges and lawyers participating in them were 
originalists, but because they were lawyers.25 
Just so, the constitutional text and history matter because American law 
says they matter.  American law says other things matter, too—such as 
 
 20. W.H. Auden, Law Like Love, in AUDEN POEMS 87 (Edward Mendelson ed., 1991). 
 21. See W. Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).  For the distinction 
between the Constitution and a constitution, see, for example, Mark Tushnett, Constitution, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 217 (2012). 
 22. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). Justices Paterson and Iredell also relied on 
Blackstone’s definition of an ex post facto law. See id. at 396, 398. 
 23. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2568, 2592 (2014). 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
 25. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A 
Response to the “Originalists,” 19 HAST. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 221 (1996). 
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subsequent practice and precedent.27  The relative weight of these 
“modalities” of construction is what theorists and decision-makers dispute.  
One need not be an originalist in any strict sense to accept this; one just need 
be familiar with the norms of American constitutional construction, both 
historically and today.28  Whether or not necessary to persuade a particular 
decision-maker, Wuerth’s resort to the historical understanding of the 
constitutional text is at least consistent with ordinary constitutional decision-
making, and, in many cases, for many decision-makers, central to it. 
II.  HOW TO CONSTRUCT THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS? 
Wuerth’s argument proceeds by a careful inquiry into the original meaning 
of Article III and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the 
implications of the original understanding for the litigation rights of foreign 
states.29  Throughout, she relies principally on conventional legal materials 
and forms of legal reasoning to engage in a close analysis of the meaning of 
the constitutional text.30  Although I have questions about some of her 
inferences and conclusions, I want to argue that her methodology is generally 
spot-on. 
First, though the original meaning and scope of constitutional rights are 
hard questions for a variety of reasons, the best way to tackle them is 
piecemeal, one question at a time, rather than categorically.  Second, 
Professor Wuerth is right to rely most heavily on materials and forms of 
reasoning that would have been familiar to late-eighteenth century legal 
decision-makers. 
A.  One Right at a Time 
Originalists today obsess about methodology.  Most agree that the object 
of constitutional interpretation should be the original meaning of the 
Constitution.31  Where a particular provision’s meaning was originally vague 
or ambiguous, though, many accept that jurists should “construct” its 
applicable principles.32  (Some would also look to subsequent debate and 
 
 27. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–22 (1991). 
 28. This is the case whether one is a constitutional pluralist, see id., or committed to 
originalism as the sole mode of constitutional interpretation, see William Baude, Is 
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015). 
 29. See generally Wuerth, supra note 5. 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. See, e.g., ILAN WURMAN, A DEBT AGAINST THE LIVING: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
ORIGINALISM 26 (2017); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 599 (2004). 
 32. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. 
L. REV. 1111, 1122 n.22 (2015) (“If the communicative content is vague or open textured, 
then the underdetermination is fixed and constitutional construction will be required to fill in 
the legal content of constitutional doctrine.”); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999). 
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practice to settle, or “liquidate,” the provision’s meaning.)33  Originalists 
disagree, however, about the boundaries between “interpretation” and 
“construction.”  They also disagree about the proper method that jurists 
should use to “construct” the meaning of a provision—should they rely 
principally (or exclusively) on original history, or may they resort to modern 
moral and political concerns?  For originalists, these disputes are grounded 
in the original meaning of the text, which may, in at least some cases, permit 
or even require a construction that changes over time depending on the 
evolution of another area of law (such as international law) or changes in 
public morality. 
For those committed to approximating an original meaning of the 
constitutional text, the construction of rights provisions can be particularly 
challenging.34  Some provisions are somewhat easy because they parrot 
specific norms from the English constitutional tradition,35 but some are 
wholly novel (like the Establishment Clause),36 and others include 
innovations unique to the U.S. Constitution (like the Seventh Amendment).37  
Still others protect “the” right at issue, perhaps presuming that the audience 
was familiar with its substance and scope, i.e., the First Amendment’s 
prohibition on infringing “the freedom of speech, and of the press.”38 
Furthermore, the provisions did not prompt much dispute during drafting 
or ratification, so there is less legislative history to illuminate the meaning of 
the Bill of Rights than there is for much of the original Constitution.39  Those 
who championed the original Constitution believed that a Bill of Rights was 
unnecessary, redundant with the Constitution’s provision of limited, 
enumerated powers.40  Some large portion of the public probably agreed with 
James Madison that the best that could be said for a Bill of Rights was that it 
was “neither improper nor altogether useless.”41 
If constitutional rights were “simple and acknowledged principles” not “of 
a doubtful nature,”42 it should be easy to ascertain their original meaning.  
 
 33. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–20 (2019); 
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 10–
21 (2001). 
 34. For one of the more influential approaches to the topic, see generally AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998). 
 35. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE 
L.J. 393 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the 
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (1998). 
 36. See Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Government-Missionary Partnerships: New Light 
on the Establishment Clause (draft on file with author). 
 37. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
 38. Id. amend. I. 
 39. See generally THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND 
ORIGINS (Cogan ed., 1997). 
 40. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 442–51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Carey & 
McClellan eds., 2001).  For a thorough consideration of the relationship between ratification 
of the Constitution and concern for a Bill of Rights, see generally PAULINE MAIER, 
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–88 (2010). 
 41. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. XXX (1789) (Rep. Madison). 
 42. X ANNALS OF CONG. XXX (1789) (Rep. Madison), in 11 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1259 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). 
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Yet scholars have gone back and forth on the original meaning of virtually 
every single one of the provisions.  As Jud Campbell has suggested in a series 
of articles, the historical materials may be especially hard for modern lawyers 
to assess because late eighteenth-century American conceptions of rights 
and, relatedly, judicial review, were dramatically different than the 
conceptions embodied in contemporary doctrine and practice.43  Some 
constitutional rights, Campbell argues, were “natural rights.” People gave 
them up for the public good.44  Legislatures (and in some cases juries), not 
courts, assessed the extent to which the public good demanded an 
infringement of the right.  Others were “positive rights” based on past 
political agreements (such as the right to jury trial) that limited the 
sovereign’s authority.45  Courts would enforce these, but there was some 
disagreement about whether courts should construe them narrowly to cover 
only the paradigmatic governmental overreach, or should construe them 
broadly to cover new, analogous acts.46  Campbell’s interpretation of the 
history may be incorrect, but its plausibility illustrates how complicated and 
shifting the evidentiary eddies can be. 
The territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights are even more 
difficult.47  At the time of the founding, numerous rules and principles under 
the law of nations and the common law overlapped to reinforce an underlying 
principle of reciprocal loyalty and protection.  Subjects, including temporary 
subjects within the sovereign’s territory peacefully, owed a duty of loyalty, 
or obedience, to the sovereign; the sovereign had a reciprocal duty to provide 
the protection of the law.48  In general, then, the result was that permanent 
subjects (or citizens) of a sovereign were entitled to the sovereign’s 
protection of law (or legal rights) wherever in the world they were.  Resident 
aliens who were the subject of a sovereign at peace with their host sovereign 
also enjoyed this reciprocal relationship with their host.  Enemy aliens 
(including residents) and aliens outside the sovereign’s territory were not 
entitled to the protection of the law.49 
As Andrew Kent has argued, it is challenging to map this background law 
onto constitutional rights.50  The Constitution simply does not mention these 
norms, and some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, especially the Fifth 
 
 43. See, e.g., Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 569 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, Judicial Review]; Jud Campbell, Natural 
Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 252 (2017) [hereinafter Campbell, First 
Amendment]; Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. 
COMM. 85 (2017). 
 44. Campbell, First Amendment, supra note 41, at 272–73; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS 125 (1953) (noting that natural 
rights could be “so far restrained by human laws . . . as is necessary and expedient for the 
general advantage of the public”). 
 45. Campbell, Judicial Review, supra note 41, at 577–78. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Kent, supra note 2. 
 48. See generally Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823 
(2009). 
 49. See id.; see also Kent, supra note 4, at 507. 
 50. Kent, supra note 2. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3501703 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520884
2019] CONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINAL SCOPE 9 
Amendment, seem to provide absolute rights to all “person[s].”  Kent chalks 
this up to hasty and poor drafting and argues that the Constitution’s rights 
provision should be constructed to incorporate the background principle of 
reciprocal loyalty and protection.51  This is a sensible way to resolve the 
issue. 
Yet, as Kent concedes, it is not the only sensible approach.52  The rules 
and principles under the law of nations and the common law that reinforced 
the underlying principle of reciprocity could—and did—change over time.  
Nations could depart from the principles of the law of nations, and courts 
could determine when the norms under either source of law had changed.53 
So the question is whether the provisions of the Bill of Rights should be 
construed to have incorporated or to have changed the background principle 
of reciprocity with respect to the rights they articulate.  This question is 
bound up with whether the Bill of Rights was understood to be a fresh source 
of positive rights or simply a declaration of existing rights (natural and 
positive). 
For Wuerth’s case, added to this complexity is the uncertainty of the 
historical relationship between jurisdiction over the person (or the rem) and 
the requirement of due process of law.  Stephen Sachs has recently argued 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment probably was 
understood to require personal jurisdiction, but only indirectly: it prohibited 
courts from depriving parties of rights without first acquiring jurisdiction 
over the person according to the general law, rather than creating a new 
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.54 
Wuerth does not provide a thorough analysis of these tensions, but she 
does argue that a construction of the historical territorial and personal scope 
of a constitutional right should proceed one right at a time.55  This contrasts 
with a categorical approach.  Such an approach could take one of two forms.  
The first would argue that the Bill of Rights incorporated the territorial and 
personal jurisdiction rules of the common law and the law of nations circa 
1791.56  This is analogous to the view that the Seventh Amendment 
incorporates the civil jury requirements of the common law as of 1791; the 
Constitution fixed the rules as of 1791, and those rules are now ours.  The 
second categorical approach would agree that the Constitution incorporated 
the law of nations and common law jurisdictional norms, but that, as those 
 
 51. See id. at 772.  See generally Kent, supra note 4. 
 52. See generally Kent, supra note 2. 
 53. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Congress and the Courts: 
Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW WORK IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531, 534–35 (Bekker et al. eds., 2010) 
(arguing that Americans would have agreed with Vattel that a nation could depart from the 
“customary” law of nations, but not the “necessary” or “voluntary” law of nations, which were 
based on natural law). 
 54. Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017); see also Wendy 
Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It?  Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, 
and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 732 (2012). 
 55. Wuerth, supra note 5, at XX. 
 56. See generally Kent, supra note 4; Hamburger, supra note 46. 
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norms change over time, the Constitution’s jurisdictional reach changes 
alongside them.57  The Constitution’s relationship to the law of nations is 
both categorical and dynamic. 
I am on Wuerth’s side.  This is for several reasons, only some of which 
sound in the current academic manifestation of originalism.  Most 
importantly, as mentioned above, contemporary constitutional construction 
gives pride of place to constitutional text.  The focus on text is not exclusive, 
of course, but it is central.  One implication is that interpreters/constructors 
should show care for linguistic details, including differences, across 
constitutional provisions.  Such differences are rarely determinative, but they 
do bear legal meaning, at least in that they render some constructions more 
or less plausible.  For instance, the Fifth Amendment’s use of “person” and 
the Eighth Amendment’s absolute prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment both suggest a broad application across categories of people.58  
The Second and Fourth Amendments, by contrast, refer to the rights of “the 
people,” which may signal a narrower group of beneficiaries.59  Perhaps 
these are differences of style or careless drafting; they cannot be both.  But 
given the priority of text in the tradition and contemporary practice of 
constitutional interpretation, constructions that downplay those differences 
should bear the burden of showing that they are meaningless. 
Second, constitutional argumentation during the early republic strongly 
suggests that Americans responsible for decision-making were comfortable 
advancing an array of arguments about the territorial and personal scope of 
constitutional rights, including arguments that they did not map precisely 
onto background norms from the common law and customary international 
law.  Central and territorial officials bickered about the application of 
constitutional limits to territorial governments.60  During the quasi-war with 
France, congressmen advanced diverse arguments about the application of 
the Bill of Rights to foreigners, including resident (quasi-) enemies.61  They 
had to navigate not only ambiguity about the meaning and substance of 
rights, but also ambiguity about the relationship between the common law 
principles and the constitutional norms.  During the War of 1812, American 
decision-makers such as Chancellor Kent and Chief Justice Marshall showed 
a willingness to apply new principles of the general law to protect resident 
enemy aliens.62  As a matter of black letter law today, many questions about 
the territorial and personal scope of constitutional rights remain unresolved.63  
 
 57. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Customary International Law, Change, and the 
Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1585 (2018). 
 58. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VIII. 
 59. Id. amends. II, IV; see also Wuerth, supra note 5, at 56. 
 60. Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism in the Northwest Territory, 167 
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 37) (on file with author). 
 61. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 256–58 (1997); Gerald Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 
909, 927-43 (1991). 
 62. See Chapman, supra note 4, at 651–54, 699–701. 
 63. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3501703 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3520884
2019] CONSTRUCTING THE ORIGINAL SCOPE 11 
Decision-makers, especially courts, proceed one case at a time, reluctant to 
make sweeping generalizations.64 
Third, there is little reason to think that questions about the territorial or 
personal scope of constitutional rights should be constructed any differently 
than the scope of federal power in general.  There seems to be little dispute 
that separation of powers and federalism provisions apply to the federal 
government, regardless where or over whom it exercises its power.  Indeed, 
some of those provisions are essential for understanding the contours of 
federal power over places outside the states.  Over the District of Columbia, 
for instance, Congress has the power to “exercise exclusive Legislation in all 
Cases whatsoever.”66  In other places, Congress’s power is limited by 
enumeration, including the Necessary and Proper Clause.67  During the early 
republic, many jurists, including John Marshall, presumed that Congress, 
though subject to implicit and express constitutional limits, was not restricted 
by the customary law of nations or the common law.68  If the law of nations 
did not limit the federal government’s power, why would it limit its limits?  
Decision-makers ascertain the territorial and personal scope of constitutional 
powers one power at a time; they should do the same with the express limits 
on those powers. 
Indeed, the express limits in the original Constitution of 1789 seem to 
suggest territorial and personal diversity.  Consider the following examples 
from Section 9 of Article I (where Madison originally planned to locate the 
Bill of Rights).  The last clause prohibits officers of the United States from 
accepting emoluments, offices, or titles “from any King, Prince, or foreign 
State.”69  One obvious application of this provision is to U.S. ambassadors 
subject to corruption by their host (or another) nation.  This purpose would 
be undermined if it did not apply extraterritorially.  The third clause, which 
prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, speaks categorically: none 
of them “shall be passed.”70  Under the view that the Constitution 
incorporated background jurisdictional norms of the common law and the 
law of nations, this provision would not apply to legislative acts against an 
enemy alien or any nonresident alien, including a corporation.  Perhaps this 
is correct, but it has a high textual hurdle to clear. 
The Bill of Attainder Clause is not merely a limit on the federal 
government as a whole; it is a limit on Congress’s authority to enact a certain 
sort of law.  The reason that many in the founding generation gave for the 
prohibition is that such laws confound the separation of the legislative, 
executive, and judicial functions—they pronounce guilt and punishment 
 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
 67. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 68. See, e.g., Murray v. The Charming Betsey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); William S. 
Dodge, The New Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (manuscript at 77) (on file with the author). 
 69. CITE. 
 70. CITE. 
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without the application of prior law by an independent court.71  As Americans 
often put it, such laws purport to deprive persons of their rights without due 
process of law.72 
None of this requires the conclusion that the Due Process Clause was 
understood to protect resident enemy aliens, foreigners abroad, or, for that 
matter, foreign states.  But it does complicate an easy division between 
constitutional limits sounding in separation of powers and federalism and 
those sounding in individual rights.  Many American jurists believed that 
such restrictions were intertwined and mutually reinforcing.  Whether they 
are best construed to have incorporated, or to have entrenched, law-of-
nations and common law territorial and personal limits is a case-by-case 
question. 
This history suggests something further: declarations of the “original 
meaning” or “original understanding” of the personal and territorial scope of 
constitutional provisions, especially rights, should be modestly held.  In 
important respects, there was no original understanding at all.  There is a text 
and historical context that provide raw materials for constitutional 
argumentation.  Jurists today, no less than decision-makers two hundred 
years ago, rely on those legal materials to construct plausible, even 
persuasive, legal meanings for the purpose of answering specific, often 
anachronistic, legal questions.  This is precisely what Wuerth has done and 
many other scholars routinely do.73 
Yet the construction of the territorial and personal scope of constitutional 
rights, because it requires facility with so many competing historical and 
contemporary literatures, represents the far edge of lawyerly historical 
synthesis.  This calls for an extra measure of modesty.  It also calls for an 
extra measure of deference to contrary constructions by historical decision-
makers in the legislative, executive, or judicial branch.  Perhaps the most 
defensible grammar for such arguments is that the original text and history 
“support” one construction or another, rather than that they “show” that the 
Constitution has this or that meaning. 
B.  Privileging the Methods of Decision-Makers 
This leads to a final point about methodology.  Originalists disagree about 
whose “understanding” of the text ought to matter for contemporary 
construction—the framers, the ratifiers, a literate member of the general 
public, lawyers, etc.  I have suggested that Wuerth’s argument depends 
 
 71. See Chapman & McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 
1672, 1781–82 (2012).  This is why Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016), was 
such a close case.  Congress conditioned the property rights of the Bank of Iran on a finding 
by a federal court in a pending case. Id. at 1317.  The Supreme Court held, over a dissent by 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Sotomayor, that Congress had not trod on the judiciary’s 
purview. Id.  A legislative act purporting to directly take Iran’s money and assign it to the 
plaintiffs, however, would have. And Iran would have had the right to contest such a 
deprivation under the Due Process Clause. See Chapman & McConnell, supra. 
 72. See generally id. 
 73. See generally Wuerth, supra note 5. 
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principally on sources of authority and forms of reasoning that have been the 
stock-in-trade of constitutional argumentation from the beginning of the 
republic.  I think this is the right approach.  In the terms of originalist 
methodological literature, it bears the closest affinity to the “original legal 
methods” approach.74 
Throughout this response, I have referred to constitutional “decision-
makers.”  By this, I have meant to suggest that the arguments advanced and 
found persuasive by those with special responsibility for making 
constitutional decisions ought to have added weight.  This is so for two 
reasons in addition to the notion that “the” original meaning of the text is 
whatever lawyers would have made of it. 
First, decision-makers have always been, and are today, under oath to 
support the Constitution.  Whatever else the oath may do, it at least has the 
possibility to uniquely pique the decision-maker’s conscience, providing an 
extra guarantee of good faith constitutional construction.75  Second, relying 
on conventional legal materials and conventional forms of legal reasoning is 
how American decision-makers have always interpreted, constructed, and 
applied the Constitution.  There is long tradition of privileging certain kinds 
of constitutional argumentation, and this tradition has its own normative 
weight in addition to whatever the first generation of constitutional 
interpreters may have done.76  Put differently, Wuerth has engaged in an 
original form of constitutional argumentation, whether she has come up with 
“the” original meaning of the Constitution or not. 
CONCLUSION 
I have meant to support the most important aspects of Wuerth’s approach 
to resolving a specific constitutional question.  She relies on conventional 
textual and historical arguments.77  So do many other scholars who study the 
Constitution’s provisions touching on foreign affairs.  Yet she, like most 
other foreign affairs scholars, offers little justification for this 
methodology.78  Perhaps none is needed.  Perhaps scholars eschew 
“originalist” methods for its perceive political taint.  What I have suggested 
here, however, is that there are good reasons for precisely the way she has 
gone about her work.  Some of them are highlighted by originalist 
methodology.  Some of them may be anathema to many originalists.  But all 
 
 74. See generally John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods 
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. 
L. REV. 751 (2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying Original Intent and 
Original Public Meaning, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1371 (2019). 
 75. Evan D. Bernick & Christopher R. Green, What Is the Object of the Article VI Oath? 
(forthcoming); Richard M. Re, Promising the Constitution, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 299, 299 
(2016).  See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL 
DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008). 
 76. See, e.g., H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (1993). 
 77. See generally Wuerth, supra note 5. 
 78. See generally id.  There are, of course, exceptions. See supra note 8 and accompanying 
text. 
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of them, I would suggest, are consonant with an enduring tradition of 
constitutional construction—even on matters of foreign affairs. 
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